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Profitability and stability trade off  
– IBs vs CBs in Turkey – what differences ? 
 
NEIFAR Malika1    
 
Abstract 
This paper consider Turkish banks case study over the period 2005–2014. To 
distinguish between interest-free and conventional banks, we use two-sided t-test, 
Multi-dimension figures, regression comparison method and Dynamic Fixed 
Effect (DFE) model. The long run comparison analysis [based on t-test, on 
regression and on Multi-dimension figures] between interest-free banks (IBs) and 
conventional banks (CBs) of bank specific factors indicates that there are 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks behavior. Both first methods 
show that Interest-free banks are riskier, have higher liquidity and are more 
capitalized. Univariate analysis (t-test based Comparison) shows in addition that 
interest-free banks are less stable, but are more solvent. While regression based 
Comparison analysis show that IBs are more profitable. Multi-dimension figures 
comparisons analysis show that Post GFC 2008, Islamic Banks are less stable, 
more solvent, and more liquid than CBs. Large IBs outperform Small IBs in term 
of profitability.  But in term of asset quality measured by NPL, LTD and LLR, 
Small IBs outperform Large IBs. Comparing CBs and IBs in DFE model, from 
GMM results, it is clear that there is no bilateral directional relationship 
between stability (Z-score) and profitability (ROA). Stability is significantly 
sensitive to the increase of profitability only for CBs, while Profitability is 
significantly sensitive to the increase of Z-score only for IBs. Post GFC, IBs 
are more stable while CBs are less profitable. Size has positive effect on 
profitability outcome for IBs. Depreciation of Turkish money and inflation 
have negative effect on CBs’ profitability. 
 
JEL classification:  G01 G21 G28 G32 Z12. 
Keywords: Financial stability, Profitability, interest-free banking, GFC, GMM,  Multi-dimension 
figures comparisons, PVAR, SURE, Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE) model. 
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I. Introduction 
 
(Rivard & Thomas, 1997)  suggest that bank profitability is best measured by 
Return on assets ROA since it is not distorted by high equity. ROA shows the 
profit earned per dollar of assets and reflects the management ability to utilize the 
bank’s financial and real investment resources to generate profits (Hassan & 
Bashir, 2003). For any bank, ROA depends on the bank’s policy decisions as well 
as uncontrollable factors relating to the economy and government regulations. 
Furthermore, Many regulators believe ROA is the best measure of bank 
profitability (Hassan & Bashir, 2003).  
 
Studies examining the performance of the banking sectors in developing 
economies are relatively scarce. 
 
 (Guru, Staunton, & Balashanmugam, 2002) investigated the determinants of 
bank profitability in Malaysia from 1986 to 1995. They divide the  profitability 
determinants into two main categories, namely the internal determinants 
(liquidity, capital adequacy, and expenses management) and the external 
determinants (ownership, firm size, and economic conditions).2 Among the 
macro indicators, high interest ratio was associated with low bank profitability 
and inflation was found to exert a positive impact on bank performance.  
(Chantapong, 2005) investigated the performance of domestic and foreign banks 
in Thailand from 1995 to 2000. All banks were found to have reduced their credit 
exposure during the crisis years and have gradually improved their profitability 
during the post-crisis years.3 (Hosono, Sakai, & Tsuru, 2006) observed that in the 
Japan case, the banks that are less profitable and cost efficient could be a target 
for a larger bank. 
 
In a study on the Tunisian banking sector, (Ben Naceur & Goaied, The 
determinants of commercial bank interest margin and profitability: evidence from 
Tunisia, 2008) examine the impact of bank characteristics, financial structure, 
and macroeconomic conditions on Tunisian banks’ net-interest margin and 
                                                          
2 The  findings  revealed that efficient expenses management was one of the most significant 
in explaining  high bank profitability. 
3 The results indicate that foreign banks’ profitability are higher than the average profitability 
of the domestic banks although importantly, during the post-crisis period, the gap between 
foreign and domestic banks’ profitability has closed, suggesting that the financial restructuring 
program has yielded some positive results. 
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profitability from 1980 to 2000. They suggest that banks that hold a relatively 
high amount of capital and higher overhead expenses tend to exhibit higher net-
interest margin and profitability levels, while size is negatively related to bank 
profitability. During the period under study, they find that stock market 
development has positive impact on bank profitability.4 The results suggest also 
that macroeconomic conditions have no significant impact on Tunisian banks’ 
profitability. 
 
(Heffernan & Fu, 2010) examined the performance of different types of banks 
operating in the Chinese banking sector from 1999 to 2006.5 Some 
macroeconomic variables and financial ratios are significant with the expected 
signs. Though the type of bank is influential, bank size is not. Neither the 
percentage of foreign ownership nor bank listings has discernable effects. 
(Sufiana & Habibullah, 2012) conclude that the success of the Chinese banking 
sector between 2000 and 2007 depends on its efficiency, profitability, and 
competitiveness. Market capitalization seems to exert regressive impact on the 
profitability.6 The empirical findings suggest that the well capitalized banks tend 
to be more profitable, while expense preference behavior exerts negative impact 
on bank profitability levels in China. The impact of GDP growth seems to 
support for the argument of the association between economic growth and the 
performance of the banking sector.7 
 
According to (Fiordelisi & Mare, 2013), profit maximization has a significant 
impact on the probability of survival of banks and further to financial stability. 
 
Two of the most commonly used models for identifying the vulnerability of a 
corporation, according to (Altman, 2000), are represented by Z-Score model and 
ZETA credit risk model. According to (Čihák, 2007), the main advantage of Z-
Score- the microeconomic financial stability measure- is represented by the easily 
                                                          
4 The empirical findings suggest also that private banks are relatively more profitable than their 
state owned counterparts. 
5 The results suggest that economic value added and the net interest margins do better than the 
more conventional measures of profitability, namely return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). 
6
 In Examining different components of economic globalization, they found that greater 
economic integration via higher trade flows, cultural proximity, and greater political 
globalization have significant and positive influence on bank profitability levels. 
7 The impact of inflation rate is also positive, but only when we control for actual flows, personal 
contacts, and political globalization. 
4 
 
computation for a financial institution or corporation.8 Also, the idea of using a 
more simplified measure for assessing the financial stability motivated (Mercieca, 
Schaeck, & Wolfe, 2007)  to develop the Z-score. 
 
(Diaconua & Oaneab, 2014) analyses the main determinants of financial  stability 
for two main important bank groups from Romania: commercial banks and co- 
operative banks for the period between the years 2008 and 2012.9 The financial 
stability of co-operative banks is found to be influenced by two factors 
represented by GDP growth and interbank offering rate for 3 months. 
 
We aim through this paper to analyze the main determinants and driven factors 
for financial stability and profitability of two main important groups of banks 
from Turky : islamic and conventional banks. For this paper we choose to apply 
the Z-score ratio to compare the financial stability of Islamic and Conventional 
banks during period 2005-2014. And, following (Sufiana & Habibullah, 2012) 
and (Ben Naceur & Omran, 2011)  among others, the second dependent variable 
used in this study is profitability measered by return on assets ratio (ROA).10 
Figure based comparisons analysis, one sample t-test, and regression based 
comparison are applied to examine the difference in term of significant factors. 
Then quantitative analysis is conducted to predict Profitability and Stability trade 
off for both type of banks. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief introduction on measures of 
profitability and stability, and their determinants, Section II provides a selected 
overview on profitablity and stability comparison between IBs and CBs. Section 
III presents both descriptive and regression based comparison analysis between 
Islamic and conventional banks in Turky during period 2005-2014. Section IV 
presents a quantitatve analysis and a bivariate Panel VAR-X model, and offers 
an econometric analysis of trade off between profitability and stability for Turkish 
IBs and CBs. Section V provides a discussion of policy options and conclusions. 
 
 
                                                          
8 On the other side, the main disadvantage of this method is represented by the fact that it does 
not catch the correlation between financial institutions (contagion relation). 
9 14 banks, namely: one co-operative bank – CreditCoop Bank and 13 commercial banks. 
10 ROA and return on equity (ROE) have been used in most bank performance studies. 
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I. Selected Review on Profitability and Stability Comparison 
 
Different researchers used different technique to measure profitability. (Bashir, 
1999) conducted a study on two Islamic banks in Sudan; Faisal Islamic Bank and 
Tadamon Islamic Bank, to examine the relationship between the  profitability 
and market valuation (dependent variables) of the Islamic banks and the size of 
the Islamic bank (independent variable). The results indicate that the growth of 
the size has a positive and strong relationship with the profitability of any bank. 
Later, (Hassan & Bashir, 2003) conducted a research to find out the determinants 
of the profitability of the Islamic banks in the Middle East. “Controlling for 
macroeconomic environment, financial market structure, and taxation, the results 
indicate that high capital-to-asset and loan-to-asset ratios lead to higher 
profitability of Islamic banks from eight countries. 
  
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000) justified higher results for Islamic banks in 
Pakistan by exploring that the financial systems which are under developed show 
more profitability but lower efficiency levels. The regression results showed that 
the greater bank development lowers the profits of the banks but improves the 
efficiency as the competition between the banks increase. The similar findings 
were revealed in a study by (Hassoune, 2002).11 Also (Rashid, 2007) studied the 
performance of Islamic banks in Pakistan. Using three ratios for the profitability; 
Return on Assets, Return on Equity and Profit Expense Ratio, he found that the 
CBs are more profitable than the islamic ones and the Return on Asset ratio is 
almost the double for the CBs during the period 1999–2006. Later, (Siddiqui, 
2008) studied the performance of Islamic banks in Pakistan. His results revealed 
that the profitability measures (Return on Assets and Return on Equity ratios) for 
two Islamic banks in Pakistan (i.e. Meezan and Albaraka) were better than the 
average for the banking industry. The ratio analysis technique is used in a study 
of comparison between Islamic and  conventional banking in Pakistan by (Awan, 
2009). The profitability ratios calculated of Islamic banks showed positive 
results that show high returns to the bank and its shareholders (Salman & Nawaz, 
2018).12 
 
                                                          
11 Findings were based on the analysis of the ROE and ROA ratios’ comparison. Islamic 
conventional banks from Gulf Cooperation Councils’ region were compared. 
12 Although Islam has allowed the profits, but the pre-determined fix amount of returns is not 
allowed. 
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A profitability comparison, using empirical techniques, between the Islamic and 
conventional banks and finance companies in Malaysia was conducted by (Rosly 
& Bakar, 2003). They found that the ratios (Return on Assets and Return on 
Deposits) results are significantly higher for the Islamic banks than the 
mainstream interest-based banks. An other comparison between the both types of 
banking was done by (Abdul-Majid, Nor, & Said, 2005) who compared the 
efficiency aspect of the Islamic conventional banking in Malaysia. They found 
that there is no significant statistical difference between the both, but Islamic 
banks’ results were better than the conventional ones. (Suyanto, 2009) used the 
ratios to compare profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency of the Bank Muamlat 
Indonesia (BMI) with the conventional banks in Indonesia. The results revealed 
that there is no significance difference among the profitability of the BMI and the 
interest-based banks. (Indriani, 2008) picked 25 banks of Indonesia from which 
2 banks were full-fledged Islamic banks to analyze the profitability performance 
of the both types of banks.  The research concludes that the Islamic banks are 
showing better performance than the conventional ones. 
 
The profitability between the Islamic and conventional banks all over the world 
was compared by (Ariss, 2010) who built a sample of banks from thirteen 
countries of the world. The study concluded that the Islamic banks have shown 
more resilience to the financial crises around the world because they invest more 
in the real assets rather than the financial assets [because in Shariah, there is a 
law that you cannot sell the things that you do not own].13 This paper concludes 
also that there is no significant difference between the profitability of the two 
types of banking [i.e. the Islamic banks are not more profitable than the 
conventional banks].14 
 
In regards to stability, (Kuran, 2004)  finds  that Islamic banks are not superior 
over conventional banks. Similarly, (Kassim, Majid, & Shabri, 2009) show in the 
context of Malaysian banking industry that the balance sheet of Islamic banks is 
more sensible to monetary policy shocks than the conventional banks. (Ergeç & 
Arslan, 2013) find that Islamic banks in Turkey are visibly more sensitive to 
interest rate change than their conventional counterparts. While, (Beck, 
                                                          
13 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is the result of the interest-based economies. 
14  But the Islamic banks have more credit (portfolio) risk because its asset base is comprised of 
loans and advances mostly. The reason is may be that Islamic banking is still as its evolutionary 
stage and does not have attained its full potential. The study also concluded that Islamic banks 
are showing less competition in the global financial markets. 
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Demirguc -Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013) and (Khediri, Charfeddine, & Youssef, 
2015) show that Islamic banks are more liquid and better capitalized which 
implies that this class of banks is more stable. This finding is supported by 
(Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013) for a data of 553 banks from 24 countries 
and (Rahim & Zakaria, 2013) for Malaysian case.15 In contrast, (Kabir & 
Worthington, 2017) find that Islamic banks are more risky than conventional 
banks, and they find no difference in credit risk between the set of clustered banks 
during the global financial crisis. In another study, (Kabir & Worthington, 2017) 
analyzing data from 16 developing economies over the period 2000 to 2012 show 
that Islamic banks are less stable than the conventional banks 
II. Data and variables 
 
Our sample contains 21 banks (17 conventional and 4 Islamic). List of Turkish 
banks is given at Appendice, see  Table A 1. We have 210 observations, or bank-
years of data, for banks operating in Turky for the calendar years 2005–2014.16  
There are 170 observations for conventional banks (CB) and 40 observations for 
Islamic banks (IB). 12 financial ratios are used in this study. All are defined in 
Table 1. We classify these ratios into six general categories: profitability ratios 
(ROA, and ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD),17 credit risk (LLR, NPL, 
LTA, LTD), insolvency risk ( DTA), Reglementary risk (CAP), and asset 
structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA).18 To ensure that our results were not driven by 
the presence of some outliers, we do correct all variables (we did not eliminate 
extreme values).19 We use also the Z-score as measure of bank stability; 
                                                          
15  (Louati & Boujelbene, 2015) attribute higher stability of Islamic banks to increased 
competition and size. Similarly, (Ghosh, 2016) suggests that capital adequacy ratios and 
reserver equirements are the primary determinants of bank's stability. 
16 Source : Bankscope. Panel data are unbalanced. 
17 Liquidity means how quickly a bank can convert its assets into cash at face value to meet 
the cash demands of the depositors and borrowers.  
18
 Regarding the later ratios, we use fixed assets to assets ratio, and off-balance sheet items to 
assets ratio to account for the operating leverage, and off-balance sheet activities, respectively. 
These ratios are used in the previous empirical banking literature (see (Srairi, 2010) and (Ben 
Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015)). 
19
 To control for the remaining outliers, we’ll use a robust estimation technique (an alternative method) 
as a superior estimation method, less sensitive to outliers, proposed by (Rousseeuw, Hampel, Ronchetti, 
& Stahel, 1986).  
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Z-score it = ROAit+(EQ/TA)itσROA     
where ROA is the standard measure of return on asset, Equity to Assets ratio 
(ETA= EQ/TA), and σROA is the fluctuation of ROA indicated by the standard 
deviation.20 . The higher the Z-score the lower is the bank's default risk. 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables and expected signs.21 
Ratios Definitions Expected sign 
for Zscore 
Profitability    
ROA Return on assets = Net income/Total assets + 
ROE Return on equity = Net income/Stockholders’ equity + 
Liquidity   
CTA Cash to assets = Cash/Total assets 
 
CTD Cash to deposits = Cash/Total customer deposits 
 
Credit risk   
LLR Loans loss reserves to gross loans 
- 
NPL Non-performing loans to gross loans 
- 
LTA Loans to assets = Loans/Total assets 
- 
LTD Loans to deposits = Loans/Total customer deposits 
- 
Reglementary risk 
 
CAP Capital adequaty ratio 
 
Insolvency risk    
DTA Deposits to assets = Deposits/Total assets 
 
Asset structure   
FAA Fixed assets to assets = Fixed assets/Total assets 
 
OBSIA Off-balance sheet items to assets = Off-balance sheet items/Total assets 
 
Dummies and Interactions 
 
IB Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise (i.e. 
Conventional banks (CB)) 
- 
Large Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank is large (size>median), 
0 otherwise 
 
Large_CB Inetraction term between large bank and conventional 
bank.22 
 
Large_IB Inetraction term between large bank and islamic bank.23  
D2008 Dummy variable equal to 1 if year > 2008 
 
Bank caracteristics 
 
                                                          
20 Z-score (which has been widely used in the literature [see for example (Laeven & Levine, 2009), 
(Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010), etc), etc) indicates the multiple of a bank's equity buffer before it falls into 
the state of default. 
21 (Ben Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015)). 
22
 Give a dummy variable equal to 1 if conventional  bank is big, 0 otherwise (small bank). 
23
 Give a dummy variable equal to 1 if islamic  bank is big, 0 otherwise (small bank). 
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Size Log(Total asset) 
 
Age  Number of years since the bank was incorporated  
 
Growth  Log(Total assets/Total assets
-1)  
 
Share Market share : percentage of comparison between Islamic banks total 
asset and banks.24  
 
Macro-economic variables 
 
GDPG Gross Domestic Product Growth (annual % change) 
 
INF Annual country inflation rate in percentage measured by annual 
% change in consumer prices 
 
Exrate Exchange rate 
 
 
A. Descriptive analysis 
 
The present study is conducted to find out the difference between the two areas 
of banking, that is, Islamic and conventional banking in Turkey over the period 
2005 to 2014. 
1. Univariate analysis: Tow sided t-test comparison 
 
At Table 9 (see Annexe section Tables B), we present descriptive 
statistics (average value for conventional and interest-free banks for each 
variable, number of observation, as well as standard deviation) and the p-value of 
a two-sided t-test. The univariate analysis shows that IB are significantly 
different from conventional banks at 5% level with respect to the most variables 
used in this study. Difference is significant for Cash to assets CTA, Cash to 
deposits CTD, Loans to assets LTA, Debt to assets DTA, Z-score, Size, AGE, 
Fixed assets to assets FAA, Off-balance sheet items to assets OBSIA, and Share.  
 
Differences in liquidity between IB and CBs are significant, interest-free banks 
are more liquid. We find that IBs hold more cash to deposits (cash to asset), CTD 
averages 15.141% for IBs versus 8.79 % for conventional banks (CTA averages 
10.9 % for IB versus 5.51 % for conventional banks). The difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level and then supports the better liquidity 
performance for the Interest free banks. 
 
                                                          
24
 Market share=Islamic bank total assets /Country banks total assets x 100%  
 See (Purboastuti, Anwar, & Suryahani, 2015) and  (Aminah, Soewito, & Khairudin, 2019). 
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Regarding the credit risk exposure, the average loans to assets ratio (LTA) of IBs 
stands at 65.66 % versus 53.81% for CBs. The difference is statistically significant 
only for the LTA ratio at 1% level and then suggest greater risk for Interest free 
banks. 
 
High debt to assets ratio (DTA) is assumed to be indicator of high leverage and 
therefore higher risk of insolvency. Hence, a low value of DTA implies that the 
bank is more capitalized and so more solvent. Here the difference in insolvency 
risk, in term of dept to asset ratio (DTA), between IBs and CBs is significant, IB 
have lower average (2.598%) than conventional bank (9.61%). This implies that 
the interest-free bank is more capitalized and then more solvent. 
 
We also consider the importance of stability. The higher the Z-score is the lower 
is the bank's default risk. The pairwise analysis suggests that overall, 
conventional banks are on average significantly more stable as indicated by Z-
scores, and also have a lower probability of default than IBs over the entire period. 
Z-scores of IBs stands at 1424.824 % versus 1938.936 % for CBs. The difference 
is statistically significant at 5% level and then in line with most empirical studies, 
CBs are more stable than IBs.  
 
2. Multi-dimension analysis: Figures based comparisons 
 
In order to investigate the evolving behavior of IB and CB (large vs small bank) 
and to check sensitivity of our results, we repeat the univariate analysis over the 
pre-crisis period (2005–2008) and the post-crisis period (2009–2015).  
 
Figure 2 to Figure 16 illustrate  comparison of means for all ratios Pre and Post 
Global Finance crisis (GFC) beween IB and CB (see Annexe section Figures A). 
Moreover, mean comparisons for each ratio or variable is done in several 
dimensions: IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB, Large_CB vs Small_CB, Pre vs 
Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between year, 
and between Quatarian banks (ID).  
From a brief look at Figure 2, we conclude that : Z-score average evolution from 
2005 to 2014 for islamic banks (IB) is different from one’s of conventional banks 
(CB). The pattern of latter path is decreasing from 2008 (post GFC) and 
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increasing pre GFC, while the former has a stationary path pre and post GFC. 
CB have higher Z-score in mean than IB during period of study. 
From Figure 3Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable., mean of Zscore 
comparisons in different dimensions say that: IB are less stable than CB, Islamic 
Banks are less stable Post GFC 2008, while no difference to depect between 
Large and Small IB,25 and between Large and Small CB in term of stability. For 
all Banks no difference in term of stability Pre and Post GFC is depected. Between 
year comparison show that Zscore in mean has recently (2014) the lowest values, 
and between Turkish banks (ID),26 3 ≡ Akbank T.A.S. is the more stable bank 
while 2 ≡ T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S. is the less stable bank in average.  
Regarding the insolvency risk, evidence shows that leverage as measured by debt 
to assets ratio DTA is lower for interest-free banks than CB and for also post  GFC 
periods (see Figure 4). IBs are more solvent than CBs post GFC. In CBs, 2 ≡ 
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S. is the less solvent bank in average. 
From Figure 5, mean of cash to assets CTA evolution from 2005 to 2014 for 
islamic banks (IB) is not very different from one’s of CB from 2013. Both have 
increasing evolution during period of study. The pattern of latter path is 
decreasing from 2013. From Figure 6, IB are more liquid than CB and Post 
GFC. 10 ≡ ING Bank A.S (CB) is the most liquid bank. 21 ≡ Tekstilbank-Tekstil 
Bankasi A.S. (CB) is the most capitalized bank in average. 
From Figure 7 (Figure 8), evidence shows that the liquidity (Capital adequaty) 
of IB, measured by cash to deposits ratio CTD (CAP), is higher than CB (no 
difference) during the two periods (before and after GFC). 12 ≡ Asya Katilim 
Bankasi AS-Bank Asya (IB) is the most liquid bank in average. 
Based on the mean of the ROA, we conclude that the CB outperform the IB 
before (and post) the financial crisis (see Figure 9). Large IB (Large CB) (do 
not) outperform Small IB (Small CB). 10 ≡ ING Bank A.S (CB) is the most 
profitable bank in average. 
NPL evolution in average from 2005 to 2014 for both type of banks is stationary. 
Based on the mean of the NPL, we conclude that the CB outperform the IB post 
2013 (see Figure 10). 
                                                          
25 A bank is said to be large if its size > median. 
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Regarding the credit rik, evidence shows that asset quality measured by NPL, 
LTD and LLR,  are higher for CBs (and Large IBs) than interest-free banks 
(small IBs), while  Large CBs have lower credit rik than small CBs [see Figure 
11, Figure 12, and Figure 13].  
B. Regression based Comparisons analysis 
 
In Turky, compaired to conventional banks -with univariate analysis- in 
average, interest-free banks are riskier and less stable, but have a higher 
liquidity, and are solvent and more capitalized.  
While univariate comparisons show significant differences between IB and CB, 
these differences could be driven by other bank characteristics. This is to be done 
within regression estimation. Different regression models are considered in this 
section. First, we Compare interest-free and CBs controlling for bank 
characteristics. Second, we do analyse cross IB difference.  
Focusing on a sample of banks with both types allows us to control for unobserved 
time-variant bank-specific effects by introducing bank and year dummies, thus 
a clearer identification of such differences than when comparing banks from 
different types.  
3. Controlling for bank caracteristics 
 
To assess differences in Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability across different bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜸𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝐵𝑖 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (A1) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is vector of Bank caracteristics,  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = (AGE𝑖,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑡, Growth𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡, OBSIA𝑖,𝑡)’, 
where 
Age = Number of years since the bank was incorporated, 
Size = Log(Total asset), 
Growth = Log(Total assets) - Log(Total assets
-1 ), 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i,  in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy 
13 
 
variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
We thus compare IBs and CBs.   
The results in Table 10 show that IBs have higher Return on assets ROA, higher 
Return on equity ROE, higher Cash to assets (CTA), higher Loans to asset (LTA), 
lower Loans to deposits (LTD), higher Loans loss reserves (LLR), higher Non-
performing loans (NPL), and higher Capital adequaty ratio (CAP). IBs are then 
more profitable, more capitalized and show higher liquidity, and higher credit 
risk. The magnitude of these differences is also meaningful, with IB having a 
2.71% point higher Return on assets and 17.93% point higher Return on equity, 
9.516% point higher Cash to assets, 16.97% point higher Loans to asset, 25.033% 
point lower Loans to deposits, 15.759% point higher Loans loss reserves, 33.55% 
point higher Non-performing loans, and 90.65% point higher Capital adequaty 
ratio (see Annexe section Tables B). 
IBs show then higher liquidity and credit risk, are more capitalized, and are 
more profitable. 
4. Cross-IB variation  
 
To controll for individual IB caracteristic in assessing the differences across 
different bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜸𝒊𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (A2) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is vector of Bank caracteristics,  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = (AGE𝑖,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑡, Growth𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡, OBSIA𝑖,𝑡)’, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), IB 
is an IB indicator, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
OLS results of regression (A2) for each group of considered measures are given 
at Table 11 (see Annexe section Tables B). Having four islamic banks, we can 
say that is each IB has significant higher Loans to asset LTA (except 14 ≡ 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS has lower), significant higher Loans loss 
reserves (LLR), significant higher Non-performing loans (NPL), significant 
higher Capital adequaty ratio (CAP), significant higher Return on assets ROA 
(except 14 has lower), and significant higher Cash to assets CTA (except 14 has 
not significant effect).  In addition :  
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13 ≡ Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bank Turkowait has significant higher Return on 
equity ROE and significant lower Loans to deposits LTD, 
14 ≡ Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS, has significant higher Cash to deposits 
CTD, 
16 ≡ Albaraka Turk Participation Bank has significant higher Return on equity 
ROE and significant lower Loans to deposits LTD.  
Again, IBs show then higher liquidity and credit risk, are more profitable 
and are more capitalized. 
All previous results can be summed up in the following Table. 
Table 2: Comparison analysis IB vs CB; a sum up. 
         Univariate   
analysis 
Regression analysis Multi-dimentional analysis 
Bank 
caracteri
stic 
Across IB 
13    14    16 
ALL 
period 
Post 
GFC 
Small 
IB 
Small 
CB 
Credit risk + + -  - 
 
- - - + 
Liquidity + +  +  
 
+ +   
Capitalization + +   + 
 
    
Solvency +     
 
+ +   
Stability -     
 
- -   
Profitability  + +  + 
 - - - + 
Note : Islamic banks are : 13 ≡ Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bank Turkowait, 14 ≡ Turkiye Finans Katilim 
Bankasi AS, 16 ≡ Albaraka Turk Participation Bank. Empty cells suggest that the determinant was 
not significant. 
III. Quantitative analysis and Results 
 
The Pearson correlation test reveals the correlation among the variables.27 The 
test result shows positive relationship of Z-score with Return on Asset ROA. 
From Table A 2 (see Annexe), we can have three principal lineaire relations  
Z-score = Ϝ (ROA, ROE, CAP, CDT, Size, Share), 
ROE = Ϝ (CTD, LTA, LTD, LLR, NPL, Z-score, OBSIA) 
                                                          
27 It indicates how the variables are related with each other and also to what extent. 
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and 
ROA  = Ϝ (ROE, CTA, CTD, DTA, CAP, Z-score, Growth). 
Significant relationship is found between ROA and ROE ratios in the correlation 
matrix. So it can not be assumed that the data set is not free from Multicollinearity 
problem (see Table A 2 in Annexe).  
The simple correlation does not imply anything regarding the causality amongst 
the variables. To find out the causal relationship between two variables Granger 
(1969) causality test is implemented between variables. From Table A 3 in 
Annexe, we deduce that Z-score = G (ROA, GDPG, CTA), while ROA = G 
(CTD, CTA, INF).28 
All the variables under the study must be stationary otherwise spurious regression 
may be found. Henceforth, Fisher-type unit-root test for PANEL data based on 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests has been implemented to ensure that all the bank 
specific variables in the regression equation are stationary. The result is shown in 
Table A 4 (see Annexe). All considered bank specific variable are stationary. Unit 
root tests results for Macroeconomic series (given also at Table A 4) are not fiable 
since PP and ADF tests for time series are asymptotic tests and we need at least 
30 observations for each variable (we have only 10 observations for each series). 
However, from Figure B 1 (see Annexe), we conclude that INF, GDPG, and 
EXrate can be considered stationary series in level. 
 
To avoid problem of multicolinearity and for a ageneralization of pairwise 
Granger Causality regression, we propose the bivariate Panel VAR-X model 
based on the following specification (with no contemporaneous terms):29 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜞𝟎 + ∑ 𝛤𝑘  𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑘𝑝𝑘=1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛼 𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (0),   𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a vector of K=2 endogenous variables 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = [Zscore𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡]’, 𝑋0𝑖𝑡 is the vector of exogenous explicative variables 𝑋0𝑖,𝑡 = (INF𝑡 , Exrate𝑡)’, 
                                                          
28
 Three macro economic variables are considered in this study : Gross Domestic Product 
Growth (GDPG), inflation rate (INF), and Exchange rate (Exrate). 
29
 For good introductions to VARs, (L¨utkepohl, 2005), (Hamilton, 1994 ), (Stock & Watson, 2001), 
and (Becketti, 2013). 
.  
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 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the Return on assets ratio, INF is the inflation rate, EXrate is the 
exchange rate, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for 2008 GFC (taking the value one from year > 
2008),  p is the optimal lag parameter to be determined, 𝚪𝟎 is Kx1 real parameter 
vector, Γk are KxK real parameter matrix, k = 1, …, p, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are the idiosyncratic 
errors independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). 
 
Before estimation, lag order for PVAR model should be chosen through 
minimizing the value of usual information criteria. Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), and Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (H-Q) have been employed for lag selection (See Table 3). From 
Table 3 all information criterion AIC, SC and H-Q are recommending p = 1 as 
optimal lag. 
From Table 4 (Maximum likelihood results for model (0)),30 the regression 
coefficient of  Z-score-1 is 0.980326, and - 0.000131, which affects the Z-score 
positively and affects negatively the ROA though the result is not statistically 
significant at 5% significance level for ROA. The regression coefficient of ROA
-
1 is 1.086382 (and 9.3098 of Z-score) which affects significantly the ROA (which 
is not significant). Diagnostic tests (in Table 5) suggest adequate specifications as 
the models show free autocorrelation errors.  
This result implies that no bilateral or unilateral directional relationship 
between stability (Z-score) and profitability (ROA). Stability (Profitability) is 
significantly sensitive only to the increase of previous Z-score (ROA). IBs are 
less profitable than CBs. Post 2008 GFC, all Turkish banks are less profitable. 
In addition, for Macroeconomic stability factors, inflation INF (exchange rate 
EXrate) has significant negative (positive) effect on profitability. 
 
 
                                                          
30 Statistical inference are based on panel-robust standard errors. 
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Table 3: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for Equation (0).  
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -188.8970 NA   0.072701  3.054352  3.099605  3.072735 
1 -14.48129   340.4594*   0.004757*   0.327701*   0.463460*   0.382852* 
2 -11.26948  6.166672  0.004818  0.340312  0.566577  0.432231 
3 -6.626667  8.765625  0.004770  0.330027  0.646798  0.458714 
 
 
Table 4: PVAR-X(1) estimation results for Equation (0).31 
 
Z_SCORE ROA 
Z_SCORE(-1)  0.980326 -0.000131 
  (0.02701)  (8.2E-05) 
 [ 36.2953] [-1.58732] 
ROA(-1)  9.309781  1.086382 
  (31.1812)  (0.09501) 
 [ 0.29857] [ 11.4341] 
INF -0.007088 -0.000911 
  (0.17384)  (0.00053) 
 [-0.04077] [-1.71995] 
EXRATE  1.077772  0.009550 
  (1.04340)  (0.00318) 
 [ 1.03294] [ 3.00366] 
IB -0.964447 -0.006323 
  (0.88140)  (0.00269) 
 [-1.09422] [-2.35419] 
D2008 -1.488695 -0.006926 
  (1.04978)  (0.00320) 
 [-1.41811] [-2.16528] 
R2  0.891407  0.454838 
Adj. R2  0.888055  0.438012 
F-statistic  265.9611  27.03189 
Log likelihood  17.86691 
 
Note : Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]. 
Table 5: Dignostic tests : VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests from Equation (0) 
model  « PVAR-X(1) ». 
Lag LRE* stat df Prob. Rao F-stat df Prob. 
1  6.214759 4  0.1837  1.564070 (4, 316.0)  0.1837 
2  6.696781 4  0.1528  1.686667 (4, 316.0)  0.1528 
 
Note : Null hypothesis: No serial correlation at lag h. 
                                                          
31 This done by Eviews 10. 
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The dynamic behavior of model (0) will be assessed using impulse response 
functions, which describe the reaction of one variable in the system to innovation 
in the other variable in the system. From Figure 1, we deduce that:  
 
 Response of Z-scores to shocks in ROA ratio: An increase of one 
percentage point in ROA ratio leads to a cumulative increase of only 1 
percentage point in Z-scores, (in the 10 subsequent year, Figure 1 in right 
head corner).  
 Response of ROA ratio to shocks in Z-score ratio: an increase of one 
percentage point in Z-score ratio leads to a cumulative decrease of only 
0.1 percentage point in ROAs (in the 10 subsequent year, Figure 1 in left 
bottom corner).  
 Response of ROA ratio to shocks in ROA ratio: an increase of one 
percentage point in ROA ratio leads to a cumulative decrease of 2.3 
percentage point in ROAs (in the 10 subsequent year).  
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Figure 1:  Impulse response function from PVAR-X(1). 
These results shows that there is no bilateral or unilateral directional 
relationship between stability (Z-score) and profitability (ROA). Then, other 
statistical models will be built on some equations to predict the differences of 
financial performance between Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) 
with respect to stability and profitability. We consider the following seemingly 
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unrelated regressions (SUR) dynamic equation model (in its reduced form, with 
no contemporaneous feedback terms):32 { 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛂𝟎 + φ1 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒i,t−1 + γROAit−1 + βXjit + μ 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛼 𝐷2008 + uit   (𝑗)   ROAit =  𝛂"𝟎 + φ"1 𝑅𝑂𝐴i,t−1 + γ"𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + β"Xjit + μ"𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛼" 𝐷2008 + u"it   (𝑗"), 
where dependent variables are yit ≡ 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝒐𝒓 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 
and 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 is a vector of exogenous explicative variables : Xjit =(MACRO variables, BANK specific variables),  j, j′′  = 1, …, 6, 
MACRO variables = (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡, INF𝑡 , Exrate𝑡), 
BANK specific variables = (𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 ,  Growth𝑖,𝑡, Share𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑡). 
So, we propose six dynamic panel models with 𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 = ( 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑡 , INF𝑡 , Exrate𝑡 , )’, 𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 = (𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 ,  Growth𝑖,𝑡)’, 𝑋3𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑋2𝑖,𝑡, 𝐒𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝒊,𝒕, 𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕, 𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞𝒊,𝒕 )’,  𝑋4𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑋2𝑖,𝑡)’,  𝑋5𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑋4𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑩𝟐, … , 𝑩𝟐𝟏)’, 
and 𝑋6𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑋5𝑖,𝑡 ,  𝐒𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝒊,𝒕,  𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕, 𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞𝒊,𝒕)’, 
where, 𝐵𝑖 are for Bank-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for 
interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for 2008 GFC (taking the value 
one from year > 2008), 𝐶𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the Cash to deposits ratio, GDPG is the gross 
domestic product growth, INF is the inflation rate, Exrate is the exchange rate,  Growth𝑖,𝑡 = Log(Total assets/Total assets-1), Share𝑖,𝑡 = Islamic bank total assets / banks total assets x 100%, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = Number of years since the bank was incorporated, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = Log(Total asset), 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (and 𝑢′′𝑖𝑡) are the idiosyncratic errors independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.). The regressions may be related because the (contemporaneous) 
                                                          
32 The SUR model was proposed by (Zellner, 1962). The term seemingly unrelated regressions 
is deceptive, as clearly the equations are related if the errors uit and u"it in different equations 
are correlated. 
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errors associated with the dependent variables may be correlated. For the SUR 
model, the relationship between 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is indirect; it may comes 
through correlation in the errors across different equations. We consider three 
alternative estimation techniques.33 The first one is the SURE for SUR models 
(1) to (5),34 and the second is the Two-stage least-squares regression (2LS) 
method.35 While these approaches are rather simple and intuitive, it give rise to 
“dynamic panel bias” which results from the possible endogeneity of the lagged 
variables and the fixed effects (in the error term). This can be avoided by applying 
a third method (for each equation of model (6)): the “system GMM” developed 
by (Arellano & Bover, 1995) and (Blundell & Bond, 1998) which give more 
precise results than “difference GMM” method of (Arellano & Bond, 1991) 
which transforms the data to first differences to remove the fixed effect element 
and uses the lagged levels of the right hand-side variables as instruments 
(including yit−1).36  
As given in  
Table 12 (see Annexe), SURE is applied for SUR dynamic models : model (1) to 
model (4) and to SUR Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE):37 equation (5). For model 
(1) to model (4), SUR estimator is biased but consistent since yit−1are not 
related to 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢′′𝑖𝑡 [see (Neifar, 2011, pp. 209-223)]. The results presented at  
                                                          
33 The reduced form can be consistently estimated by OLS. 
34 It is the OLS on the entire system of equation. As might be expected a priori, if the only link 
across equations is the error and the errors are treated as being uncorrelated then joint estimation 
(SURE) reduces to single-equation estimation (OLS on each equation). In the structural form, 
due to the presence of endogenous variables OLS and SUR estimators are inconsistent. 
Consistent estimation methods are placed in the context of GMM estimation (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005). 
35 Seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE) is considered for Equation (1) to Equation 
(5). Fixed effects (FE) is used in equation (5) to control for omitted variables that differ between 
banks but are constant over time. 
36 By transforming the regressors in first difference, the Bank fixed-effect is removed, but a 
new bias is potentially introduced: the new error term can be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. Under the assumption that the error term is not serially correlated and that 
the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, (Arellano & Bond, 1991) define the  two-step 
GMM procedure. In the first step of their GMM estimator, error terms are assumed to be 
homoskedastic and independent over time and across banks. Then, in the second step residuals 
obtained in the first step are used to build a consistent estimate of the variance–covariance 
matrix. Assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity are then relaxed, making the two-
step estimator asymptotically more efficient than the first-step one. 
37
 Individual-specific effects (such as banks) is controlled for. Generally imposes homogeneity 
of all slope coefficients, allowing only the intercepts to vary across banks.  
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Table 12 broadly confirm that both bank-level and macroeconomic factors play a 
role in affecting the banks’ stability and profitability quality. Diagnostic tests (in 
Table 13, see Annexe) suggest not adequate specifications as we reject the 
hypothesis that correlation between residuals 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢′′𝑖𝑡 is zero for each 
considered model.38 However, all these estimation results are presented only for 
reference since for correlated residuals case, we have better to use the feasible 
GLS estimator,39 or pooled 2LS method. 2LS estimation results will be reported 
here (see Table 6). A Sum up of sign of significant variables from Table 6 are 
given at Table 7 here after. From Table 7, contrary to model (0) results, we 
depict here some bilateral directional relationship between stability (Z-score) 
and profitability (ROA). Looking at Table 7 or Table 7, this result implies that 
stability is significantly sensitive both to the increase of previous Z-score and to 
decrease of previous profitability. Profitability is also sensitive both to an 
increase of previous Profitability and stability. IBs are less stable than CBs. In 
addition, Post 2008 GFC, Turkish banks are less stable and less profitable. For 
Macroeconomic stability factors, inflation INF (exchange rate EXrate) has 
significant negative (negative) effect on profitability. GDPG has significant 
negative effect on stability and profitability. While Cash to deposit (CTD) has a 
positive effect on profitability but Growth has negative effect on stability and 
profitability. Again, all estimation results for models with fixed effect cases are 
presented here only for reference also since for dynamic models system GMM 
estimation is the consistent estimation method. System GMM results for the more 
general DFE model (dynamic model (6)) for each dependent variable are given 
at Table 14 (see Annexe).40 For either stability or profitability side, results are 
given for All banks, for IBs, and for CBs. A sum up of sign for significant 
variables are collected in Table 8 given below. Looking at Table 8, in comparing 
CBs and IBs, it is clear that there is no bilateral directional relationship 
between stability (Z-score) and profitability (ROA). Stability is significantly 
sensitive to the increase of profitability only for CBs, while Profitability is 
significantly sensitive to the increase of Z-score only for IBs. Post GFC, IBs are 
                                                          
38 However, each model show global signification. In addition, for model (5), individual effects 
are significant. 
39
 This estimator is generally more efficient than systems OLS, though it can be shown to 
collapse to OLS if the errors are uncorrelated across equations or if exactly the same regressors 
appear in each equation (see (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 210)). This estimator is 
asymptotically normal. 
40 GMM is applicable to the cases in which the number of periods is small relative to the number of 
cross-sectional observations (T < or = N). Otherwise - asymptotic imprecision and biases may arise. 
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more stable while CBs are less profitable. Size has positive effect on profitability 
outcome for IBs. Depreciation of Turkish money and inflation have negative 
effect on CBs’ profitability. 
I. Conclusion 
 
This paper consider Turkish banks case study over the period 2005–2014. The 
first aim of the current paper was to compare between the features of Interest free 
banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) in Turky using selected financial ratios. 
12 financial ratios are used in this study. We classify these ratios into six general 
categories: profitability ratios (ROA, and ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and 
CTD), credit risk (LLR, NPL, LTA, LTD), insolvency risk (DTA), 
Reglementary risk (CAP), and asset structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA). We use 
also the Z-score as measure of bank stability. Our sample contains 21 banks (17 
conventional and 4 Islamic. We have 210 observations, or bank-years of data, for 
banks operating in Turky. The long run comparison analysis (based on regression 
and on t-test) between interest-free banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) of 
bank specific factors indicates that there are difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks behavior. Both methods show that Interest-free banks are 
riskier, have higher liquidity and are more capitalized. Univariate analysis (t-
test based Comparison) show in addition that interest-free banks are less stable, 
but are solvent. While regression based Comparison analysis show that IBs are 
more profitable. Specifically, profitability is driven by Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bank 
and Albaraka Turk Participation Bank. Multi-dimension figures show that Post 
GFC 2008, Islamic Banks are less stable, more solvent, and more liquid than 
CBs. Large IBs outperform Small IB in term of profitability. But in term of asset 
quality measured by NPL, LTD and LLR, Small IBs outperform Large IBs. In 
comparing CBs and IBs in DFE model, from GMM results, it is clear that 
there is no bilateral directional relationship between stability (Z-score) and 
profitability (ROA). Stability is significantly sensitive to the increase of 
profitability only for CBs, while Profitability is significantly sensitive to the 
increase of Z-score only for IBs. Post GFC, IBs are more stable while CBs are 
less profitable. Size has positive effect on profitability outcome for IBs. 
Depreciation of Turkish money and inflation have negative effect on CBs’ 
profitability (the macroeconomic dimension of financial stability and CBs’ 
performance are strongly linked).  
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Table 6: 2LS estimation results. 
   
Zscore     ROA   
Variable (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)    
Zscore -1 .98055455*** 1.0054186*** .99178582*** 1.0056124*** .58554106*** -.00013024    .00008279**  .00005461    .00008295**  .00044081*** 
ROA-1 4.3243715    -79.444904**  -102.88011*** -68.753297*   -59.601451    1.0804031*** .57440085*** .50172817*** .58322903*** -.00422389    
GDPG -.24848045***         -.16373027*** -.10116853**  -.00030195    -.00014132    -.00014063    -.00027651*** -.00027926*** 
INF -.18969422            -.06877852    -.08127497    -.00112816    -.00055875*   -.00057021*   -.00061554*   -.00057178**  
EXRate 1.7073919            2.0213768    1.8480387    .01033702**  -.00402711    -.00532695*   -.00235804    -.01235447*** 
IB -.97691677    .10675094    .77759761    -.19106533    -3.8477286*** -.00633699**  .00055819    .00264049*   .00031228    -.00263293    
D2008 -2.3264792**  -1.3728213**  -1.2319524*   -2.1130362*** -.73690924    -.00794251**  -.00609773*** -.00587185*** -.00670893*** -.00536078*** 
CTD     -3.1988158    -4.8347214    -2.4916197    -6.7755766        .00812028    .00611663    .00870422    .01363839*   
Growth     -20.733711*** -20.016152*** -16.616334*** -15.74421***     -.03036862*** -.02964202*** -.02696886*** -.01642058**  
Share         16.165594                    .02056106            
AGE         .01051739                    .00003767**          
size         -.16764271                    .00028855            
Bank                                         
2                 -12.316078***                 .00965235*   
3                 6.3787325***                 -.0050485    
4                 -6.0564204***                 .00200255    
5                 -7.3974756***                 .0070171**  
6                 3.7330341*                   -.01217047*** 
7                 -1.1797431                    -.00467046*   
8                 3.0291105*                   -.00639346**  
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9                 -2.1010916                    -.00973996*** 
10                 -12.651126***                 -.00401026    
11                 -6.8701685***                 -.00174211    
12                 -5.1232694**                  .00752906*   
13                 -1.541295                    -.00229792    
14                 -2.7725515                    .00468079    
15                 -.83137902                    -.00691589*** 
16                 (omitted)                    (omitted)    
17                 -11.392243***                 .00123347    
18                 -7.7600457***                 -.00236093    
19                 -2.4143897*                   .00195724    
20                 -3.8402346**                  -.0148185*** 
21                 -11.878409***                 -.0075394**  
                                          
_cons 2.540997    4.8019909*** 4.2488861*** 3.0434751    14.587866*** .00300559    .02313108*** .02386289*** .02167906*** .04092088*** 
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Table 7: Sum up of sign for significant results for Equations (1), (2), (3), (4), 
and (5) from Table 6. 
  Zscore      ROA   
Variable (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)    
Zscore -1 + + + + + 
 
+  + + 
ROA-1  - - - 
 
+ + + +  
  
   
  
    
GDPG - 
  
- - 
   
- - 
INF 
      
- - - - 
EXRate  
   
 + 
   
- 
CTD  
        
+ 
Growth 
 
- - - - 
 
- - - - 
Share 
         
 
AGE 
       
+ 
 
 
Size 
         
 
IB 
    
- - 
 
+ 
 
 
D2008 - - - - 
 
- - - - - 
Bank 
         
 
13 
    
 
     
14 
    
 
     
16 
    
 
     
 
Note : Only islamic bank effects are reported in this table; 13 ≡ Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bank Turkowait, 
14 ≡ Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS, 16 ≡ Albaraka Turk Participation Bank. Note: Empty cells 
suggest that the determinant was not significant. 
Table 8 : Sum up of GMM results for model (6) (see Table 14) 
  Z-score    ROA  
Variable ALL CBs   IBs Variable ALL  CBs   IBs  
Zscore-1  + + Zscore +  + 
Zscore-2  +      
ROA + +  ROA-1 - +  
CTD    CTD    
GDPG    GDPG - -  
INF    INF - -  
EXRate + +  EXRate - -  
Growth  -  Growth  - - 
Share    Share    
AGE    AGE  + - 
Size -   Size   + 
IB    IB    
D2008   + D2008  -  
 
Note: Empty cells suggest that the determinant was not significant. 
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ANNEXE 
Bank List  
Table A 1: List of Turkish banks covered in this study.41 
Conventional Banks Islamic Banks Islamic window or Branch  
 1 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S, 
 2 T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 
 3  Akbank T.A.S., 
 4 Yapi Ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.,  
 5 Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S.,  
 6 Turkiye Vakiflar Bankas TAO-, 
 7 Denizbank A.S., 
 8 Finansbank A.S.,  
 9 Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S.,  
 10 ING Bank A.S.,  
 11 HSBC Bank A.S., 
 15 Sekerbank T.A.S., 
 17 Alternatifbank A.S., 
 18 Citibank A.S., 
 19 Anadolubank A.S., 
 20 Burgan Bank AS,  
 21 Tekstilbank-Tekstil Bankasi 
A.S.,  
 12 Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-
Bank Asya, 
 13  Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bank 
Turkowait ,  
 14 Turkiye Finans Katilim 
Bankasi AS,  
 16 Albaraka Turk 
Participation Bank  
 2 T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S 
(2014) 
                                                          
41 Source : Islamic financial instituitions, Global investment and Business Center , USA 2009 
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Tables A : descriptive analysis. 
Table A 2 : Correlation matrix 
 
ROA ROE CTA CTD LTA LTD LLR NPL DTA CAP Zscore FAA OBSIA size Growth 
ROA 1.0000                
ROE 0.2728* 1.0000               
CTA 0.6161* -0.0328 1.0000              
CTD -0.1591* -0.1903* 0.9258* 1.0000             
LTA 0.1174 -0.1842* 0.2972* 0.2023* 1.0000            
LTD 0.0016 -0.2715* 0.0180 0.2949* 0.8055* 1.0000           
LLR 0.0470 -0.1607* -0.0473 -0.0450 0.1565* 0.1511 1.0000          
NPL 0.0325 -0.2699* 0.0251 -0.0679 0.1662* 0.1692* 0.9433* 1.0000         
DTA 0.2193* 0.0702 -0.1574* -0.0693 -0.3842* 0.0932 -0.0739  -0.0028 1.0000        
CAP 0.4277* -0.0317 0.3018* -0.0318 0.1651* 0.1024 0.2982* 0.3737* -0.0865 1.0000       
Zscore 0.2159* 0.1443* 0.1168 -0.2268* -0.0786 0.0788 0.1213  0.0628 0.0027 0.2537* 1.0000      
FAA -0.0705 0.1163 -0.0815 -0.2237* 0.1566 -0.0923 0.1345  0.2206* -0.2044* 0.0820 0.0120 1.0000     
OBSIA -0.0632 0.1527* 0.0269 0.1014 0.3615* 0.0571 -0.0247  0.1108 -0.1986* 0.0351 -0.0596 0.4711* 1.0000    
size -0.0617 0.0261 -0.1129 -0.1050 0.1936* 0.2105* -0.0579  -0.1961* -0.0622 -0.0511 0.3111* 0.0316 -0.1532* 1.0000   
Growth -0.4156* 0.0106 -0.3696* 0.0861 0.0640 0.0943 -0.2806* -0.1736* -0.0312 -0.1518* -0.1424 -0.0051 0.1287 0.0251  1.0000  
 
 (SUITE) 
 
Share AGE GDPG INF EXRate Size OBSIA FAA Zscore DTA CAP 
Share 1.0000            
AGE 0.2428* 1.0000           
GDPG 0.0662 0.0113 1.0000          
INF 0.0131 -0.0228 -0.0023 1.0000         
EXRate -0.0781 0.0752 0.1295 -0.2414* 1.0000        
Size 0.7860* 0.1749* 0.0472 -0.0417 0.1249 1.0000       
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OBSIA -0.1332 -0.2649* -0.1120 0.0384 -0.4766* -0.1532* 1.0000      
FAA 0.1093 -0.1372 -0.1854* 0.1316 -0.6053* 0.0316 0.4711* 1.0000     
Zscore 0.4463* 0.0126 -0.0279 -0.0224 -0.0535 0.3111* -0.0596  0.0120 1.0000    
DTA 0.0369 0.2638* 0.0894 0.0055 0.1179 -0.0622 -0.1986* -0.2044* 0.0027 1.0000   
CAP -0.1117 -0.1249 -0.0382 -0.0452 0.1113 -0.0511 0.0351  0.0820 0.2537* -0.0865 1.0000  
 
 
Table A 3: Pairwise Granger causality tests results (all banks).  
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  
 ROA does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  6.88319 0.0014 
 GDPG does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  2.72298 0.0691 
 Z_SCORE does not Granger Cause CTD  2.52553 0.0846 
 CTA does not Granger Cause ROA  5.76213 0.0039 
 CTD does not Granger Cause ROA  3.54833 0.0321 
 CTA does not Granger Cause CTD  5.04075 0.0080 
 CTA does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  10.0673 8.E-05 
 ROA does not Granger Cause CTD  3.04915 0.0514 
 ROA does not Granger Cause INF  5.19681 0.0066 
 
(Suite) 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.   Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  
 CTA does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  10.0673 8.E-05  ROA does not Granger Cause CTA  4.19828 0.0169 
 Z_SCORE does not Granger Cause CTD  2.52553 0.0846  CTD does not Granger Cause ROA  3.54833 0.0321 
 GDPG does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  2.72298 0.0691  ROA does not Granger Cause CTD  3.04915 0.0514 
 Z_SCORE does not Granger Cause GROWTH  2.40365 0.0947  DTA does not Granger Cause ROA  2.65549 0.0738 
 LLR does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  3.84956 0.0244  ROA does not Granger Cause EXRATE  4.63083 0.0112 
 NPL does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  4.15517 0.0182  ROA does not Granger Cause GDPG  6.94012 0.0013 
 Z_SCORE does not Granger Cause NPL  2.81085 0.0644  ROA does not Granger Cause GROWTH  3.05047 0.0510 
 ROA does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  6.88319 0.0014  ROA does not Granger Cause INF  5.19681 0.0066 
32 
 
 Z_SCORE does not Granger Cause SHARE  3.17857 0.0446  LTA does not Granger Cause ROA  3.25127 0.0425 
 Z_SCORE does not Granger Cause SIZE  3.74231 0.0261  ROA does not Granger Cause LTA  2.73686 0.0692 
 NPL does not Granger Cause CAP  2.61162 0.0778  LTD does not Granger Cause ROA  3.66682 0.0287 
 CTA does not Granger Cause NPL  3.66198 0.0288  ROA does not Granger Cause SIZE  3.57912 0.0305 
 EXRATE does not Granger Cause NPL  7.47452 0.0009  CTA does not Granger Cause CTD  5.04075 0.0080 
 INF does not Granger Cause NPL  9.78219 0.0001  CTA does not Granger Cause EXRATE  3.96405 0.0211 
 NPL does not Granger Cause INF  3.70708 0.0273  CTA does not Granger Cause FAA  3.80236 0.0246 
 LLR does not Granger Cause NPL  4.45751 0.0136  CTA does not Granger Cause GDPG  2.72440 0.0690 
 NPL does not Granger Cause LLR  3.70841 0.0274  CTA does not Granger Cause GROWTH  3.50756 0.0330 
 LTA does not Granger Cause NPL  2.94917 0.0562  CTA does not Granger Cause LLR  2.38912 0.0966 
 NPL does not Granger Cause LTA  3.19094 0.0446  ROA does not Granger Cause CTA  4.19828 0.0169 
 NPL does not Granger Cause LTD  3.51485 0.0328  CTA does not Granger Cause ROA  5.76213 0.0039 
 NPL does not Granger Cause ROA  2.82601 0.0634  CTA does not Granger Cause SIZE  3.92478 0.0219 
 NPL does not Granger Cause ROE  3.07088 0.0503  CTA does not Granger Cause SHARE  2.84583 0.0614 
 CTA does not Granger Cause ROA  5.76213 0.0039     
 
Table A 4: Unit root tests results. 
Series:   
Z_SCORE  CAP  NPL  CTA  CTD  ROA  
Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots          
Ha: At least one panel is stationary  
Inverse chi-
squared(42)   P 78.9930 0.0005 76.3052 0.000 159.9065 0.0000 91.0724 0.0000 69.9588 0.0043 99.4212 0.0000 
Inverse normal            
Z -4.0240 0.0000 -3.9393 0.000 -8.3097 0.0000 -5.0600 0.0000 -3.0788 0.0010 -4.7356 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(109)      
L* -3.9141 0.0001 -3.7761 0.000 -9.4172 0.0000 -4.8923 0.0000 -3.0084 0.0016 -4.7903 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-
squared Pm 4.0363 0.0000 3.7430 0.000 12.8647 0.0000 5.3542 0.0000 3.0506 0.0011 6.2652 0.0000 
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Series:   LLR  LTA  LTD  DTA  Size  ROE  
 
Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value Statistic 
p-
value 
            
Ho: All panels contain unit roots          
Ha: At least one panel is stationary  
Inverse chi-
squared(42)   P 144.4197 0.0000 239.0403 0.000 202.3963 0.0000 115.4939 0.0000 105.5019 0.0000 130.8295 0.0000 
Inverse normal            
Z -7.6806 0.0000 -10.8462 0.000 -9.6884 0.0000 -6.0215 0.0000 -5.2145 0.0000 -7.0558 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(109)      
L* -8.4232 0.0000 -14.1487 0.000 -11.9846 0.0000 -6.4931 0.0000 -5.5464 0.0000 -7.4739 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-
squared Pm 11.1749 0.0000 21.4989 0.000 17.5007 0.0000 8.0188 0.0000 6.9286 0.0000 9.6921 0.0000 
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(SUITE) 
   
UNIT ROOT TEST TABLE (PP) 
 At Level     
  
EXRATE GDPG INF  
With Constant t-Statistic  3.8501 -2.2551 -3.8358  
 
Prob.  1.0000  0.2025  0.0223  
  
n0 n0 **  
 
At First Difference    
Without Constant & Trend  t-Statistic -1.6627 -4.5763 -8.8147  
 
Prob.  0.0896  0.0006  0.0000  
  
* *** ***  
   
UNIT ROOT TEST TABLE (ADF) 
 At Level     
  
EXRATE GDPG INF  
With Constant t-Statistic  1.5661 -2.2936 -1.1894  
 
Prob.  0.9968  0.1924  0.6210  
  
n0 n0 n0  
  
n0 n0 n0  
 
At First Difference    
Without Constant & Trend  t-Statistic -1.6688 -3.1622 -9.3590  
 
Prob.  0.0886  0.0061  0.0001  
  
* *** ***   
Notes: (*) Significant at the 10%; (**) Significant at the 5%; (***) Significant at the 1%. and (no) Not Significant  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.42  
 
Tables B : Comparaisons analysis. 
 
Table 9 : Descriptive statistics and Student t-test. 
 ALL CB  IB   
 
n  mean sd n  mean sd n  mean sd P-value 
ROA 193 .0193576 .0259189 156 .0206264 .0277494 37 .0140081 .0152008 0.1632 
ROE 190 .1388358 .1210041 155 .1417093 .1210887 35 .1261106 .1215544 0.4924  
CTA 193 .0652268 .09778 157 .0551287 .1026173 36 .1092659 .0553279 0.0025  
CTD 158 .1007801 .0704179 126 .0879228 .0648006 32 .1514057 .0697414 0.0000  
LTA 169 .560567 .2096241 137 .5381456 .1914332 32 .6565587 .256189 0.0037  
                                                          
42 This Result is The Out-Put of Program Has Developed By 
Dr. Imadeddin AlMosabbeh : 
College of Business and Economics   
Qassim University-KSA    
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LTD 170 .9484259 .3783962 138 .9624246 .3847613 32 .8880562 .3488561  0.3179 
LLR 167 .0345241 .0248195 135 .0362872 .0265981 32 .0270859 .0130363 0.0591 
NPL 174 .0356351 .0335987 140 .0365693 .0364189 34 .0317882 .0176753 0.4583  
CAP 195 .1228891 .0797092 159 .124583 .0876871 36 .1154075 .0208739 0.5342  
 DTA 189 .0835103 .1264901 155 .0961298 .1355694 34 .0259801 .0349729 0.0032  
Zscore 190 18.44231 13.21694 155 19.38936 14.1414 35 14.24824 6.562992 0.0373 
size 195 .7539522 1.331144 159 .867895 1.309969 36 .2507048 1.324976 0.0116  
Growth 173 .0806047 .2565585 141 .075053 .2820979 32 .1050668 .0711306  0.5517 
AGE 209 42.36842 32.46986 170 48.32353 33.03461 39 16.41026 8.203715  0.0000  
FAA 193 .0102442 .0088522 157 .0096438 .0084388 36 .0128626 .0101879 0.0488  
OBSIA 181 .3466323 .2807703 145 .3031737 .2031026 36 .5216738 .4431312  0.0000  
Share 195 .0512821 .0377879 159 .0563752 .0393879 36 .0287873 .0165219 0.0001  
GDPG  5.533961 4.379833        
INF  8.350525 1.243829        
EXRate  1.599256 .2776358         
 
Table 10 : Comparing IB and CB, Controlling for bank caracteristics (Equation 
(A1)). 
 Profitability   Liquidity  
Variable Return on assets 
ROA    
Return on 
equity ROE 
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to deposits 
CTD 
Loans to assets 
LTA    
IB .0271333*** .17932051*** .09516815**  .00534336    .16969299*** 
Size -.06630188*** -.09661668    -.12973542    .18980719**  -.30814304**  
AGE .00293712*** .00910014**  .00395183    -.00569576*   .00925899*   
Growth -.03465697    .11772032    -.20396646    .10795743    -.16937439    
FAA -.47457229    2.6342023    -3.8235729    1.3833103    1.3241565    
OBSIA .0195969    -.02122544    .0331041    .02660155    -.00630036    
_cons -.02845603    -.15487398    .07899595    .02340712    .49960141*** 
N 159    159    161    132    128    
R2 .56988564    .43818629    .50346486    .65042365    .83659155    
F 2.5084962    8.3427349    3.2608104    14.934238    .    
(suite) 
  Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans to deposits 
LTD     
Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL    
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA   
Zscore   
IB -.25033395**  .1575922**  .3355371*  .9065175** -.02843441  40.727202   
Size .19391233    -.03836427*** -.08089682** -.17426484** -.01579491  -10.129109*  
AGE -.00328416    .0193789**  .04393319*  .12215414** .00869137  3.8545281   
Growth .27324308    -.01464263    .02277159   .10413754   .02338494  -6.721993   
FAA 1.3040811    .2245825    -.22726153   -2.5657667*  -1.8931406  -237.04071   
OBSIA -.05105111    .00574731    -.00445966   .03072488*  .08866465* 3.7633983   
Trend     .00354395**  .00822303*  .02352681** .00145193  .59665264   
_cons 1.0794779*** -1.0791208**  -2.4828857*  -6.9492389** -.39771221  -185.49768   
N 130    126    134   161   158  159   
R2 .53812368    .67913552    .55066914   .49586129   .34475533  .87135263   
F 11.03766    10.468849    11.337814   3.7636723   3.2651938  87.268742   
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Table 11 : Comparing Islamic and conventional banks, testing for cross-IB 
variation ; Equation (A2). 
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 Profitability  Liquidity  Credit risk  
Variable Return on 
assets ROA    
Return on 
equity ROE 
Cash to assets 
CTA    
Cash to 
deposits CTD 
Loans to assets 
LTA    
Loans to 
deposits LTD 
    
IB                         
12 .05722303**  .18924429    .13286497*   -.0707209    .36183473**  -.23744181    
13 .04131399*** .1820295*** .09489755**  -.03747574    .20513132*** -.26752226*   
14 -.10643381**  .0991874    -.21204656    .46744645*** -.47192103**  .38284487    
16 .0271333*** .17932051*** .09516815**  .00534336    .16969299*** -.25033395**  
                         
Size -.06630188*** -.09661668    -.12973542    .18980719**  -.30814304**  .19391233    
AGE .00293712*** .00910014**  .00395183    -.00569576*   .00925899*   -.00328416    
Growth -.03465697    .11772032    -.20396646    .10795743    -.16937439    .27324308    
FAA -.47457229    2.6342023    -3.8235729    1.3833103    1.3241565    1.3040811    
OBSIA .0195969    -.02122544    .0331041    .02660155    -.00630036    -.05105111    
Trend                         
_cons -.02845603    -.15487398    .07899595    .02340712    .49960141*** 1.0794779*** 
N 159    159    161    132    128    130    
R2 .56988564    .43818629    .50346486    .65042365    .83659155    .53812368    
F 2.5084962    8.3427349    3.2608104    14.934238    .    11.03766    
(suite) 
 Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss reserves 
to gross loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL    
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA   
Zscore   
                
IB                
12 .5441893**  1.2333434*  3.3809929** .10960636  95.341813   
13 .36580977**  .82669134*  2.2322796** .11382118  72.999468   
14 .51866667**  1.2057987*  3.4417946** .10200073  93.335277   
16 .1575922**  .3355371*  .9065175** -.02843441  40.727202   
Size -.03836427*** -.08089682** -.17426484** -.01579491  -10.129109*  
AGE .0193789**  .04393319*  .12215414** .00869137  3.8545281   
Growth -.01464263    .02277159   .10413754   .02338494  -6.721993   
FAA .2245825    -.22726153   -2.5657667*  -1.8931406  -237.04071   
OBSIA .00574731    -.00445966   .03072488*  .08866465* 3.7633983   
Trend .00354395**  .00822303*  .02352681** .00145193  .59665264   
_cons -1.0791208**  -2.4828857*  -6.9492389** -.39771221  -185.49768   
N 126    134   161   158  159   
R2 .67913552    .55066914   .49586129   .34475533  .87135263   
F 10.468847    11.337323   3.7636718   3.2651937  87.268761   
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note : 12 Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya, 13  Kuveyt Turk 
Katilim Bank Turkowait , 14 Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS, 16 Albaraka Turk Participation Bank. 
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Tables C : Quantitative analysis results 
Table 12: SURE estimation results for Equation (j) and (j′′), j, j′′ = 1, …, 5.43 
   
Zscore     ROA   
Variable (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     
Zscore-1 .98055455*** 1.0054186*** .99178582*** 1.0056124*** .58554106*** -.00013024    .00006351    .00002508    .00008295**  .00044081*** 
ROA-1 4.3243715    -79.444904**  -102.88011*** -68.753297*   -59.601451    1.0804031*** .5983041*** .53441056*** .58322903*** -.00422389    
GDPG 
-.24848045*** 
        -.16373027*** -.10116853**  -.00030195            -.00027651*** -.00027926*** 
INF -.18969422            -.06877852    -.08127497    -.00112816            -.00061554*   -.00057178**  
EXRate 1.7073919            2.0213768    1.8480387    .01033702**          -.00235804    -.01235447*** 
IB -.97691677    .10675094    .77759761    -.19106533        -.00633699**  .00061245    .00259308*   .00031228        
D2008 -2.3264792**  -1.3728213**  -1.2319524*   -2.1130362*** -.73690924    -.00794251**  -.00592402*** -.00572695*** -.00670893*** -.00536078*** 
CTD     -3.1988158    -4.8347214    -2.4916197    -6.7755766        .00145932    -.00265248    .00870422    .01363839*   
Growth     -20.733711*** -20.016152*** -16.616334*** -15.74421***     -.03316682*** -.0317287*** -.02696886*** -.01642058**  
Share         16.165594                    .03061393            
AGE         .01051739                    .00003303*           
Size         -.16764271                    .00006228            
Bank                                         
2                 -12.316078***                 .00965235*   
3                 6.3787325***                 -.0050485    
4                 -6.0564204***                 .00200255    
5                 -7.3974756***                 .0070171**  
                                                          
43
 This is done by STATA 15. 
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6                 3.7330341*                   -.01217047*** 
7                 -1.1797431                    -.00467046*   
8                 3.0291105*                   -.00639346**  
9                 -2.1010916                    -.00973996*** 
10                 -12.651126***                 -.00401026    
11                 -6.8701685***                 -.00174211    
12                 -8.9709979***                 .00489613    
13                 -5.3890235***                 -.00493085*   
14                 -6.6202801***                 .00204786    
15                 -.83137902                    -.00691589*** 
16                 -3.8477286***                 -.00263293    
17                 -11.392243***                 .00123347    
18                 -7.7600457***                 -.00236093    
19                 -2.4143897*                   .00195724    
20                 -3.8402346**                  -.0148185*** 
21                 -11.878409***                 -.0075394**  
Statistics                     
     
N 168    137    137    137    137    168    137    137    137    137    
r2                     
     
r2_a                     
     
F                     
     
 
Note : legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
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Table 13: Diagnostic tests from Seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) of models (j) and (j′′), j, j′′ = 1, ...,5. 
Equation 1 Obs Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P 
Breusch-Pagan 
test of residual 
independence: 
chi2(1)44 
Zscore 168 7 4.146021 0.8990 1495.92 0.0000 
19.671, 
Pr = 0.0000 
ROA 168 7 .0130287 0.4609 143.63 0.0000  
Equation 2 Obs Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P  
Zscore 137 6 2.867188 0.9497 2586.87 0.0000 
33.323,  
Pr = 0.0000 
ROA 137 6 .0054867 0.4807 126.83 0.0000  
Equation 3 Obs Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P  
Zscore 137 9 2.835129 0.9508 2648.82 0.0000 
31.312,  
Pr = 0.0000 
ROA 137 9 .0053217 0.5115 143.45 0.0000  
Equation 4 Obs Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P  
Zscore 137 9 2.771555 0.9530 2778.09 0.0000 
29.844, 
Pr = 0.0000 
ROA 137 9 .0052474 0.5250 151.44 0.0000  
Equation 5 Obs Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P  
Zscore 137 28 2.385373 0.9652 3798.37 0.0000 
41.056, 
Pr = 0.0000 
ROA 137 28 .0041978 0.6960 313.72 0.0000  
 
 
                                                          
44 Empirical Correlation between residuals 𝑢𝑖𝑡and 𝑢"𝑖𝑡 is equal to 0.3422, 0.4932, 0.4781, 0.4667, and 0.5474 for respectively equation (1) to 
equation (5). 
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Table 14 : Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step difference GMM results for all banks. 
 Z-score   ROA  
Variable Coef. t Variable Coef. t 
Zscore-1 .00424296    0.969 Zscore .00114902*** 5.16 
ROA 280.4331*** 5.20 ROA-1 -.18378232**  0.027 
CTD -7.2816801    -0.85 CTD .0150208    1.24 
GDPG -.00355209    -0.08 GDPG -.00015181*   -1.83 
INF .16719901    1.18 INF -.00053141**  -2.38 
EXRate 7.503768*** 3.05 EXRate -.020135*** -2.89 
Growth 3.8787125    0.52 Growth -.00543375    -0.45 
Share -181.54572    -1.36 Share .01571606    0.10 
AGE 1.2390468    1.26 AGE -.00055172    -0.33 
Size -16.954858*   -1.90 Size .01043883    0.63 
D2008 1.2395578    1.42 D2008 -.00445545*   -1.84 
N 116     N 116     
F 30.997066     F 11.22145     
Sargan/Hansen 12.96 (1.000)  Sargan/Hansen 18.23 (0.991)  
AB(1) for AR(1) -2.03 (0.042)  AB(1) for AR(1) -2.37 (0.018)  
AB(2)  for AR(2) -0.87 (0.383)  AB(2) for AR(2) -0.76 (0.445)  
 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Note : p-values are reported for Sargan/Hansen test, and AB(1) and AB(2) tests. Fisher global significant test statistic. AB(1) statistic is 
the Arellano-Bond tests for first ordrer autocorrelation and AB(2) statistic is for second order autocorrelation. The Hansen /Sargan-test suggests that the instruments used are 
uncorrelated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond tests rejects the hypothesis that the errors are not autocorrelated in the first order (AR(1)), but cannot reject this hypothesis 
for the second order (AR(2)). 
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(suite Table 14) Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
Z-score  
 
ROA 
 
CB    IB45     
 
CB    IB   
Variable Coef. t Coef. t Variable Coef. t Coef. t 
Zscore-1 .75668265*** 8.06 .44204813*** 5.05 Z-score .00008436    1.09 .00077834**  5.81 
Zscore-2 .27590444**  2.69      
  
 
 
 
ROA 197.14442*   1.88 107.33129    1.46 ROA-1 .40012511*** 3.13 .41945993    1.95 
GDPG -.05839565    -0.47 -.06829913    -1.43 GDPG -.00022609*   -1.76 -.00007255    -0.30 
INF .13211539    0.70 .35178383    1.60 INF -.0007107*   -1.93 -.00002934    -0.05 
EXRate 4.2814188*   2.01 -4.7414248    -1.34 EXRate -.00492754    -0.97 -.00990485    -0.77 
CTD -2.9293257    -0.33 -3.886086    -0.62 CTD .01156788    1.17 .02688319    0.74 
Growth -28.583898*   -1.85 -6.4456993    -0.72 Growth -.03625121*   -1.96 -.04110295    -1.61 
Share -39.643269    -0.66 -47.099825    -0.60 Share .02892957    0.40 -.68243412*** -6.17 
AGE -.03601899    -1.52 1.5204563    1.36 AGE .00006803*** 3.05 -.00106594**  -3.87 
Size .85529556    0.56 -9.4022339    -1.12 Size .00047553    0.27 .01293582*** 10.72 
IB     IB   .04900614    2.24 
D2008 -1.0016993    -1.11 1.6175743*** 12.17 D2008 -.00735877*** -4.39 -.00130232    -1.04 
_cons -4.6185983    -0.81      _cons .02504627**  2.57 0     
N 93     23     N 110     27     
F 444.66632     2.5747678     F 23.527918     68.092647     
Sargan/Hanse
n  
49.42 (0.172)  0.00 (1.00)  
Sargan/Hansen  
5.10 (1.00)  20.01 (0.130)  
AB(1) for AR(1) 
-2.31 (0.021)  -1.73 (0.084)  AB(1) for AR(1) -2.62 (0.009)  -1.62 (0.105)  
AB(2)  for 
AR(2) 
-1.65 (0.098) 
 
-0.95 (0.341)  
AB(2) for AR(2) 
-0.07 (0.948)  -0.85 (0.393)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 One-step difference GMM is used. 
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Figures A : Mean comparaisons. 
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Figure 2 : Turkish Zscore average evolution 2005-2014. 
 
Figure 3 : Mean of Zscore comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
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Figure 4 : Mean of DTA comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
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Figure 5 : Turkish CTA average evolution 2005-2014. 
 
44 
 
 
Figure 6  : Mean of CTA comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
 
 
Figure 7  : Mean of CTD comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
 
Figure 8  : Mean of CAP comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
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Figure 9  : Mean of ROA comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
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Figure 10 : Turkish NPL average evolution 2005-2014 
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Figure 11  : Mean of NPL comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
 
Figure 12  : Mean of LTD comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
 
Figure 13  : Mean of LRR comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
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Figure 14  : Mean of LTA comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
 
 
Figure 15  : Mean of Size comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
 
Figure 16  : Mean of Share comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
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Figures B 
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Figure B 1 : Turkish Macroeconomic variables evolution from 2005 to 2014. 
 
Figure B 2 : Turkish Z-score average evolution from 2005-2014. 
  
Figure B 3 : Turkish CTA average evolution from 2005-2014. 
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Figure B 4 : Turkish ROA  average evolution from 2005-2014. 
  
Figure B 5 : Turkish DTA average evolution from 2005-2014. 
